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The Global Financial Crisis and Countercyclical Fiscal 
Policy∗ 
 
I. Introduction: Sub-Saharan countries and the Crisis 
 
 What began as a financial crisis concentrated in the United States of America 
spread through major developed countries and into the middle income countries of 
Latin America, Asia and North Africa.  Initially there was hope that low income 
countries, because of their underdeveloped financial sectors, might be spared from the 
crisis.  However, emerging evidence suggests that by the end of 2008 the effects had 
reached the countries of the sub-Saharan region.    
 Evidence from almost fifty years indicates a close correlation between the 
growth of the developed countries and the sub-Saharan countries, shown in Figure 1.  
When one adjusts for the very low growth rates of the sub-Saharan region in the 
1980s and 1990s, statistics reveal that a one percentag  point change in the average 
growth rate across the OECD countries was associated with a change in the sub-
Saharan average of .42 percentage points with a one year lag.   
Applying this simple relationship, the OECD growth rate for 2008 and projected 
rates for 2009 and 2010 can be used to estimate the rates for the sub-Saharan.  After a 
six percent average across the countries of the region in 2007, the estimated and 
projected rates are 3.7 (2008), 3.0 (2009), and less than one percent (2010), a severe 
downturn after the brief growth recovery during 2003-2007.  The challenge to the 
policymakers of the sub-Saharan region is to design macro policies to prevent this 





                                                
∗ A version of this paper was presented in Pretoria in July 2009 to the Meeting of the African 
Task Force of the Initiative of Policy Dialogue.  I thank Joseph Stiglitz, Deepak Nayyar and 
Howard Stein for their comments. 
Figure 1:  Growth of the OECD Countries and the Sub- aharan Countries, 

































































The OECD average is lagged one year.  The OECD growth rate for 2008 is actual value, 
2009-2010 are projections.  The sub-Saharan values for 2008-2010 are estimated from the 
following equation (probability that the coefficient is zero is given under the coefficient): 
 y(SS) = .027 + .426y(OECD) - .019D(82-99) 
 (.000) (.011) (.001) 
 Adjusted R2 = .387 
 Degrees of freedom = 43 
 D(82-99) is a binary variable with a value of one for 1982-1999. 
Sources: 
World Bank: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/ 
OECD: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/61/0,3343,en_2649_3457_2483901_1_1_1_1,00.html 
II. Introduction: Role of Fiscal Policy 
 
 Because of their dependence on commodity exports with volatile world prices, 
growth rates of developing countries tend to fluctuate more than rates for advanced 
industrial countries.  This is particularly true of sub-Saharan countries, which except 
for South Africa have few manufactured exports.  The orthodoxy before the current 
financial crisis was that liberalising the external current account and deregulating the 
capital account would create relative price adjustments that would reduce the effects 
of the external ‘shocks’ that destabilise growth.  However, empirical evidence 
suggests that in the 1990s and 2000s growth rates in the sub-Saharan region were as 
or more unstable than before the liberalising policies of the 1980s (see Weeks 2008 
and 2009a; Weeks and Geda 2007). 
 Until 2008 the macro policy framework common to most African countries 
was based on the hope that relative price changes would allow economies to approach 
their growth potential:  a programme generalising deregulation across all markets, 
combined with a cautious monetary policy and a neutral fiscal policy would enable 
these relative price changes to be realised in practice.  This analysis, known 
technically as the ‘price constrained framework’, has as its prerequisite that the world 
economy is operating near its potential.1  Since mid-2008 it has been clear that the 
world economy is quantity constrained:  aggregate demand is insufficient to permit 
the world economy to achieve its potential.  For this reason the governments of the 
major industrial countries have introduced ‘stimulus packages’ of varying sizes, 
designed to replace the fall in private sector demand with public sector expenditure. 
 What is true for the advanced countries can also apply to developing countries.  
Lower demand from the advanced countries means lower expenditures by households 
and businesses on internationally traded commodities.  World trade in the major 
export commodities of African countries, from cotton to cocoa, has fallen in the last 
twelve months.  Declining prices of these commodities cannot restore their quantities 
and values to their pre-2008 level.  The fundamental problem is not that the 
commodities are too expensive, but that there is a deficiency of demand at any price 
of a specific commodity and at any set of relative prices.  Were it the case, for 
                                                
1 The theoretical and policy difference between ‘price constrained’ and ‘quantity constrained’ 
economies is discussed in Weeks (1989).  The recently revised edition can be found at 
http://jweeks.org. 
example, that Sierra Leone’s exports of cocoa did not fall, this would mean that the 
cocoa exports of some other country fell.  
 In the context of a demand constrained world economy, African governments 
have two general policy options.  Governments can pursue a ‘business-as-usual’ and 
‘hope-for-the-best’ option in which they continue with the policy framework designed 
for a robust world economy and await international recovery.  This would mean 
continuing to follow advice to place primary emphasis in macro policy on preventing 
inflation, attempting to reach a target for the fiscal deficit, and maintaining a free-
floating exchange rate.2 
 Choosing this option, as Dr Johnson said of second marriages, would represent 
a triumph of hope over experience.  When the world economy is deflating a fiscal 
policy guided by fears of inflation would result in a contraction of the demand for 
domestic goods to aggravate the contraction in exports.  As the economy contracted 
due to the world recession and a restrictive fiscal policy, any deficit target would 
become more difficult to realise.  A reduction in exp nditure, or an increase in taxes, 
would further depress private domestic expenditure, which would reduce revenue 
from sales taxes.  For example, an attempt to reduce the fiscal deficit by one 
percentage point would require a reduction of natiol income by a multiple of one 
percent.  The nominal depreciation of a floating exchange rate in the context of lower 
export demand could result in a declining economy aggr vated by an inflationary 
spiral. 
 The other option, adopted by most governments in rich countries, has been an 
active fiscal policy, to reduce the impact of the international downturn through 
purposeful management of the public budget.  The policy bjective is to compensate 
for fluctuations in private sector demand by use of ‘c untercyclical’ fiscal policy.  
After it fell out of political fashion for almost three decades, opinion has moved back 
in favour of countercyclical fiscal intervention.   
 A January 2009 IMF report on the world economy called for a ‘firm 
commitment’ to a ‘timely implementation of fiscal stimulus across a broad range of 
advanced and emerging economies’.  In line with this commitment, a May 2009 press 
                                                
2 A clear statement of this approach is found in an IMF report on the global financial crisis, 
Countries should focus on macroeconomic stability. In some countries with falling 
inflation there may be scope for monetary easing; others, however, still experience 
continued or renewed price pressures. Those with flexible exchange rates should allow 
them to move, so that they function as shock absorbers. (IMF 2009a, viii) 
release reported that the IMF recommended a fiscal timulus for a low income 
country, Mozambique.3  In its survey of the impact of the financial crisis, the World 
Bank also recommended that governments ‘assess their ability to undertake 
countercyclical policies’.4  The African Development Bank as well has recommended 
countercyclical fiscal intervention.5  Without explicitly mentioning countercyclical 
measures, in 2009 the IMF recommended for Sierra Leone that the country’s fiscal 
deficit be allowed to increase to respond to the impact of the financial crisis on import 
prices.6  
These statements and recommendations by international agencies suggest that 
a new policy consensus is emerging in favour of countercyclical responses to the 
world downturn.  It is appropriate that policy makers in Africa take advantage and 
follow this emerging view.  This paper considers how the countries of Africa might 
design and implement such a policy. 
 
III.  Countercyclical Fiscal Intervention 
 Countercyclical Expenditures 
Countercyclical policy increases demand when the economy grows below its 
long run potential, and decreases it when output rises towards its potential, where 
there appear resource scarcities and inflationary pressure.  Taxes can be used for 
countercyclical intervention, but in practice they are a clumsy instrument for demand 
management.  Changing the public sector’s net contribution to aggregate demand with 
                                                
3 The complete passage reads as follows, 
In current circumstances, the timely implementation of fiscal stimulus across a broad range of advanced 
and emerging economies must provide a key support to world growth.  Given that the current projections 
are predicated on strong and coordinated policy actions, any delays will likely worsen growth prospects. 
Countries that have policy room should make a firm co mitment to do more if the situation deteriorates 
further. Fiscal stimulus packages should rely primaly on temporary measures and be formulated within 
medium-term fiscal frameworks that ensure that the envisaged build up in fiscal deficits can be reversed 
as economies recover and that fiscal sustainability can be attained in the face of demographic pressur. 
(IMF 2009c, 1) 
 A press release titled ‘IMF Mission Calls for Fiscal Stimulus in Mozambique’ states, ‘In the short term, 
given Mozambique’s low level of public debt, the [IMF] mission sees scope to at least partly offset th impact of 
the global economic crisis on Mozambique with somewhat more expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. (IMF 
2009d). 
4 ‘The challenge for policymakers in this environment is to assess their ability to undertake countercycli al policies 
given the resources available to them as well as their institutional and administrative capacity to rapidly expand 
and adapt existing programs.’ (WB 2009, 10) 
5 The AfDB’s 2009 report calls on donors and lenders to ‘[Focus] on results, rather than prescribing rigid policies 
and actions, allowing countries space to respond according to their particular needs and circumstances.’  More 
specific, it recommends that donors and governments ‘[i]ncrease flexibility in macroeconomic frameworks to 
allow more scope to balance macroeconomic stability and the need to stimulate domestic demand.’ (ADB 2009, 2) 
6 ‘[IMF] Staff is proposing that the primary fiscal deficit be revised upward by 0.4 percentage points of GDP to 
accommodate the unanticipated budget impact of the rise in world oil prices.’ (IMF 2009b, 5). 
the tax instrument requires either new taxes or altering rates.  In most countries both 
require legislative action, followed by changes in administrative procedures.  This can 
be a lengthy process that fails to achieve demand changes with the speed necessary to 
respond to changes in private demand.  Public expenditure offers the more effective 
mechanism for compensating for private demand fluctuations. 
A country’s medium and long term growth rates are determined by the 
development of capacity, skills and technical change, with the last embodied in capital 
investment.  Since public investment contributes to increasing capacity, it is unwise to 
use it as a countercyclical instrument.  Because public investments by their nature 
mature over several years, to use them as a countercyclical instrument would imply 
abandoning or suspending capital projects, resulting in waste of resources.  The 
expenditure flexibility necessary for an effective countercyclical policy must be found 
in the current account of the public budget.   
 To summarise, if a country’s potential growth rate is low, increasing public 
investment subject would be the appropriate response.  Simultaneously a government 
would use current expenditure to generate the demand necessary to reach the greater 
potential created by the public investment.  Public expenditure is a more effective 
instrument for countercyclical intervention than taxation, because of the relative 
inflexibility of the latter.  Capital projects are inappropriate because they often cannot 
be initiated quickly enough to respond to demand declin s, and cannot be stopped 
without wastage when the economy becomes over-heated.  Much of current 
expenditure is also inappropriate because it is not practical or rational to suspend it.  
For example, it would not be rational health or education policy to hire more medical 
staff or teachers during a downturn and lay them off when the economy recovers. 
 Effective countercyclical expenditure would be based on what might be called 
‘semi-capital’ programmes, defined as programmes that use relatively employment 
intensive techniques to create rapidly completed facilities that have a large component 
of repair and maintenance, similar to what the ILO defines as ‘labour-intensive public 
works’.7  Examples of such programmes are digging sanitation ditches, repair of 
public buildings, environmental improvement through erosion reduction, and clearing 
of rural footpaths.  These activities are currently being implemented throughout Sierra 
Leone by the National Commission for Social Action.   
                                                
7 See, for example, the ILO website on this type of pr ject, 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/recon/eiip/index.htm 
Such projects would make a contribution to community welfare, and their 
primary purpose is to increase expenditure through the consumption outlays of those 
employed directly and indirectly.  These programmes would be: 
1) identified and ‘stock-piled’ prior to the need for them, with accounting 
procedures in place to reduce the likelihood of misuse of funds; 
2) easily initiated and quickly terminated, implying that they should be 
implemented by the central government in order to avoid delays due to limited 
administrative capacity of local governments; and 
3) designed so that wages and salaries are the major element of expenditure, 
with a low capital component. 
Some issues that plague public works projects with controversy need not be 
relevant for ones whose purpose is primarily countercyclical.  For example, the wage 
at which workers are paid is a secondary consideration because these are not long 
term or even medium term employment schemes.  While proj cts for a countercyclical 
demand impact should not pay wages that disrupt local labour markets, their impact 
on internal migration will be limited because of their short term nature.  Further, these 
programmes would be introduced when the labour is in excess supply, and would be 
unlikely to affect prevailing wage rates.  A recent study in Sierra Leone by MoFED 
experts recommended this type of employment programme, ‘cash for work’, as a 
possible policy measure to counter the effects of the financial crisis (MoFED-EPRU 
2009). 
Finally, and of great practical importance, clear rules should be established for 
the initiation and termination of countercyclical projects.  A ‘countercyclical’ 
expenditure that becomes permanent negates its purpose.  Initiation and termination 
could be triggered by a policy rule based on appropriate macroeconomic indicators.  
The specific indicator will vary by country, determined by the development and 
structure of the economy.   
The programmes that could effectively serve as countercyclical interventions 
exist in Sierra Leone, administered or executed by the National Commission for 
Social Action (NCSA) and the Youth Employment Scheme (YES).  Both have 
demonstrated their effectiveness.  Both are relatively small and their primary function 
is not to have an impact on the macro economy but to generate employment.8   
Currently supported by donors, the World Bank in the case of the NCSA projects, 
these programmes could be funded from the government budget as its countercyclical 
instruments.   
If the size of the stimulus required to prevent an economy from declining is 
large, some donor support in addition to current commitments might be required.  
However, donor funding does not lend itself to countercyclical expenditure because of 
its fixed schedule of allocation and disbursement.  To make their funding more 
appropriate for countercyclical programmes, donors could adjust their allocation 
procedures to allow for an ‘aid fund’ analogous to funds created for resource booms.  
Money could be drawn from such a fund when the economy was below potential, and 
‘hoarded’ when the economy approach full potential.  If donor grants are primarily 
used to fund public investment, they would not be used for countercyclical 
expenditures for reasons explained above.   
As a practical matter, the countercyclical fiscal stimulus in most African 
countries must be largely funded by public sector bor owing.  If the implied increase 
in the deficit exceeds a level consistent with achieving other policy goals, such an 
inflation target or size of the domestic public debt, increased grants should be sought 
to fill the funding shortfall.  Inflationary pressures and domestic debt accumulation 
are discussed in the next section. 
 Arguments over deficits 
 As discussed above, the use of the public sector balance between revenue and 
expenditure as a tool to stabilise economies near full potential was generally accepted 
as sound macro management prior to the 1980s.  Active fiscal policy passed out of 
fashion due to political changes in advanced countries.   Abandoning an active fiscal 
policy was justified on technical grounds by two arguments:  the possible inflationary 
effect of deficits, and the putative tendency for public borrowing to ‘crowd out’ 
private borrowing by causing interest rates to rise.  The analysis of the relationship 
between public deficits and inflationary pressures is straight-forward.   
 If the economy is operating at full potential, increased spending from any 
source, public or private, must result in a reduction of expenditure of another type.  If 
                                                
8 The most important NCSA project is supported by US$ 4 million from the World Bank.  It employs about 14,000 
people in activities of infrastructure maintenance.  The YES projects are more varied including both employment 
and ‘franchising’, which in practice means selling goods on commission.   
the expenditure is by the public sector, its inflationary impact will depend on how it is 
financed.  If the expenditure is financed through borrowing, creating or increasing the 
fiscal deficit, the borrowing can be though sales of g vernment securities to the 
private sector (‘open market operations’) or by theministry of finance borrowing 
from the central bank (‘monetising the deficit’).   
 Bonds sales to the private sector ensure that the expansion of the deficit is not 
inflationary, because the net change in the money supply is zero.  The government 
takes money out of circulation by the bond sale, and returns the same amount to 
circulation through its increased expenditure.  If the private sector holds its desired 
amount of bonds before the increased public spending, it would be necessary for the 
government to offer the bonds above the prevailing nterest rate in order to sell them 
successfully.  If the increased bond rate transmits to private financial markets, 
‘crowding out’ of private sector borrowing would occur if private investment is 
sensitive to formal sector interest rates.  If the government borrows directly form the 
central bank, the money supply increases and, with the economy at full potential, 
inflation results.  There is an important exception t  this.  If the economy is open, the 
increased money in circulation will in part or whole be spent on imports, reducing the 
inflationary impact, but creating or increasing a trade deficit. 
 If the economy is operating a less than full potential, neither type of deficit 
financing should generate more than minor and transitory inflation, though ‘crowding 
out’ could occur.  An increase in government expenditure financed by bond sales to 
the private sector would increase aggregate demand.  With no change in the money 
supply, implied by open market operations, the increased output would generate 
upward pressure on interest rates, depressing private nvestment expenditure.  As a 
result the net change in aggregate demand would be ess than the increase in public 
expenditure, though still positive.  Financing the expenditure by direct borrowing 
from the central bank would imply that the increase in aggregate demand would equal 
the increase in public expenditure.  Monetising the deficit generates an increase in the 
money supply sufficient to circulate the increased output that results from more public 
expenditure. 
 Few sub-Saharan countries have sufficiently developed bond markets to allow 
for fully effective open market operations.  In the absence of an effective secondary 
bond market (re-sale market), the major motivation of commercial banks to hold 
public bonds is statutory requirements on the composition of bank reserves.  As a 
result, high interest rates are required to induce banks to purchase bonds beyond legal 
requirements.  In addition, commercial banks play a limited role in financing 
productive investment in most sub-Saharan countries.  The combination of the 
absence of a secondary market and high yields on public bonds implies that financing 
deficits by bond sales has the perverse effect of further discouraging commercial 
banks from funding productive investment, which are riskier than holding government 
securities.9  The major economic effect of higher interest rates is to increase the cost 
of servicing the domestic public debt.  
 With the economy well below its potential with idle land and labour, 
monetising the deficit is an effective tool for the expansion of aggregate demand, 
generating neither inflation nor ‘crowding out’ of private expenditure.  The 
government’s expenditures on infrastructure could be consciously designed to ‘crowd 
in’ private investment by lowering costs of transport, electricity and water supply.  In 
the context of some African countries, the cost of servicing the public debt is a greater 
concern than inflation or ‘crowding out’.    
In summary, the proposed increase in the fiscal deficit would be unlikely to 
generate inflationary pressures, and even less likely to provoke a ‘crowding out’ of 
private expenditure.  The net increase in the public debt would be minor.  There is no 
important technical argument against a stimulus package that relies on financing 
increased expenditure by monetising the deficit. 
 
IV.  Exchange rate management 
 In many cases, fiscal expansion will need to be accompanied by a rise in the 
exchange rate, either as an automatic response (depreciation) or by conscious 
management (devaluation).  To achieve the desired outcome of preventing a decline in 
the economy, the exchange rate adjustment accompanying the fiscal stimulus should 
be consciously managed.  Management is necessary in o der to prevent a deterioration 
of the trade balance. 
 The fiscal expansion, by increasing output and private demand, will increase 
imports and generate a trade deficit or make an existing deficit larger.  This is the 
problem that tended to undermine the use of active fiscal policy in developing 
countries in the past, and to discredit it as an instrument of macro management.  
                                                
9 This process is discussed in detail for Zambia in Weeks, et. al. (2006). 
Exchange rate depreciation or devaluation can be used to counter the tendency of 
fiscal expansion to create an unsustainable trade balance.  To be effective, the 
depreciation or devaluation must increase the price of traded commodities compared 
to non-traded commodities.   
A necessary and intended result of the depreciation or devaluation is a rise in 
the domestic price level equal to at least the ‘pass-through rate’ (marginal propensity 
to import) times the change in the nominal exchange rat .  While necessary and 
intended, this exchange rate induced increase in the price level creates the risk of 
destabilising inflation if the nominal devaluation is large.  Managing this risk is an 
essential part of a successful active fiscal policy. 
 As fashion moved against active fiscal policy over the last three decades, there 
was a shift to a view that ‘flexible’ exchange rates are the only practical policy choice 
for governments.  Therefore, it is necessary to explain why exchange rate 
management by African governments would be both feasible and possible as part of 
policy to counter the global crisis.10  Because in practice almost all governments 
intervene in foreign exchange markets,11 the policy choice is not between ‘fixed’ and 
‘flexible’ exchange rate regimes, but selection of the most appropriate point on a 
range of forms and degrees of intervention in the context of the characteristics of the 
economy (Fischer 2001).  From a practical policy pers ctive, governments and 
central banks repeatedly shift between ‘flexible’ and ‘fixed’ exchange rates.  Any time 
a central bank intervenes to moderate the rise of fall o  the national currency, it is 
‘fixing’ the exchange rate, however briefly. 
 The exchange rate management that would be part of the proposed stimulus 
package would not seek to maintain a ‘fixed’ rate for the domestic currency against 
any foreign currency.  The purpose of the intervention would be to control the rate of 
depreciation of the national currency against the currencies of major trading partners 
in order to prevent a widening of the trade gap as the economy expanded.  The 
exchange rate managers would face two possible contexts, one in which the fiscal 
                                                
10 An argument in favour of a global return to managed exchange rates is found in Rolnick and Webber (1989), 
who write, ‘we maintain there is a convincing case that a fixed exchange rate system is feasible and should be 
established. Theory shows it feasible, and overlooked empirical evidence shows it possible.’ 
11 The IMF categorises countries by exchange rate regime, and the Annual Report for 2007 lists only thirty-five 
countries out of over 150 as having an ‘independently floating’ exchange rate.  Only two were in the sub-Saharan 
region, Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia.  The listing of the latter seems an anomaly in light of he 
political turmoil in the country.  Another anomaly is the absence of Sierra Leone from the table of exchange rate 
regimes. 
expansion was accompanied by no ‘weakening’ of their currency and another in 
which fiscal expansion automatically provokes depreciation.12   
 The devaluation case occurs if there is no market pressure to weaken th 
national currency as public expenditure increases.  In this case the government must 
act directly on the exchange rate.  The purpose is to raise the price of tradables, which 
will reduce private import demand and raise the return o exporters.  How devaluing 
the currency would be achieved would be determined by the characteristics of 
financial and foreign exchange markets in each country.  For example, in Sierra Leone 
it would be done by the government setting a higher Leone price for major currencies 
in the foreign exchange auction.  In the absence of market pressure to weaken the 
national currency there would be no private speculation to undermine the devaluation.  
In effect, the government would be implementing temporarily a ‘crawling peg’ 
exchange rate regime.  In this case exchange rate mnagement is necessary to achieve 
a real devaluation in the absence of market pressur for depreciation.   
 The depreciation case occurs if the fiscal expansion is accompanied by market 
pressure to weaken the national currency.  Exchange rate management becomes more 
complicated, but is still required and remains manageable.  While the market pressure 
to weaken the exchange rate serves the government’s purpose, intervention is 
potentially necessary in order to prevent the currency from depreciating at a rate that 
generates unmanageable inflation pressures.13  Because the intervention seeks to slow 
the depreciation rather than stop it, the likelihood of speculative attack is greatly 
reduced.  In summary, even in the depreciation case, the exchange rate authority 
should implement depreciation in order to prevent excessive nominal exchange rat 
weakening. 
  
V. Constraints on Macro Policy 
 
Policy Action to Counter the Global Crisis 
To counter the effects of the international crisis on the domestic economy, 
most governments in Africa could initiate a macroeconomic stimulus 
package.  The package would be fiscal expansion complemented by 
currency depreciation implemented through exchange rat  management.  
                                                
12 The well-known Fleming-Mundell model predicts that  fiscal expansion would result in exchange rate 
appreciation.  That analysis is not relevant to Sierra Leone because the country has no significant level of portfolio 
capital flows due to lack of the necessary financial institutions. 
13 Exchange rate management in Zambia is discussed in detail in Weeks, et. al. (2007). 
The fiscal expansion would be largely financed by borrowing from the 
central bank, with a component of additional external assistance.  
Exchange rate management is a necessary complement in order to 1) to 
raise the relative price of tradables to prevent the fiscal expansion from 
generating an unsustainable trade deficit; and 2) to achieve a real exchange 
rate associated with the fiscal expansion that is sufficiently trade altering 
but not excessively inflationary.   
 
The policy package faces two types of constraints o its effectiveness:  1) 
those arising from the adjustment dynamics of the policy package itself;  and 2) those 
derivative from donor behaviour and conditions.  The first type can be managed by 
the government.  The second type requires flexibility on the part of donors and the 
IMF. 
 As explained, the most important constraint on a successful outcome of the 
implementation of the policy package is the inflation nduced by the weakening of the 
exchange rate.  Exchange rate induced inflation feeds back into the external sector by 
reducing the real depreciation associated with any nominal depreciation.  The 
inflation constraint is made tighter by the calculation if economy suffers from a 
substantial structural rate of inflation.  It would be prudent for the government to 
identify an inflation rate which it considers to be the maximum consistent with 
macroeconomic stability.  This would constrain the nominal devaluation managed by 
the central bank.    
 Less important than inflation but significant constraints are the trade balance 
and the fiscal deficit.  In the absence of additional donor support, the stimulus 
package should not increase substantially the trade deficit, which in many countries is 
sustainable on the basis of those donor inflows and remittances.  This constraint 
would be loosen by the real devaluation.  With the goal of not generating a 
burdensome public debt, the fiscal deficit should be should be carefully monitored, 
though not made a binding constraint. 
 Depending on the size of the external shock to be redressed and existing donor 
flows, a country may not require a substantial increase in grants for the fiscal stimulus 
to be effective in stabilising the economy.  However, the government will need donors 
and the IMF to grant it ‘policy space’ through the following measures: 
1) elimination of conditionality and ‘benchmarks’ for deficit limits, since the 
stimulus package requires a modest increase; 
2) donor reliability on delivery of assistance because the fiscal stimulus will be 
‘finely tuned’ and late or non-delivery of assistance could provoke 
macroeconomic instability; and, more generally, 
3) a suspension of the ‘business as usual’ approach to negotiations over 
assistance which emphasise policy issues such as tax reform that the external 
crisis has rendered of less immediate importance. 
 The combination of a carefully calibrated stimulus package and donor 
flexibility offers the firm prospect of overcoming the potentially serious effects of the 
external shock to the economy.  While the stimulus package involves risks, these are 
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